The Aresan Clan is published four times a week (Tue, Wed, Fri, Sun). You can see what's been written so far collected here. All posts will be posted under the Aresan Clan label. For summaries of the events so far, visit here. See my previous serial Vampire Wares collected here.

Tuesday, May 31, 2011

Punishment via prison or Flogging?

An intriguing idea in Peter Moskos new book In Defense of Flogging, namely that flogging is a better idea than prison in many cases. He defends the idea in a recent interview, and Matt Welch at Reason is intrigued by the idea.

The basic idea is that prison is a bad idea for most criminals by whatever standard you use. If you believe in a retributive theory of punishment then you must admit that prison is very expensive expensive way of punishing people for their crimes and that there are simpler and cheaper solutions — financial penalties and physical punishment are just as retributive and a whole lot cheaper. if you abide by a rehabilitative theory of punishment, then prison is a horrible idea. Prison has a poor track record of rehabilitating prisoners and much more frequently makes people more likely to engage in future criminal activity. The last thing you want to do to help someone is to lock them up with a bunch of hardened criminals.

The only people you really want to lock up are people who are a danger to society. It makes sense to lock up Charles Manson, BTK and the Son of Sam, but not so much someone incarcerated for marijuana possession, or for that matter Bernie Madoff and Martha Stewart. Prison is expensive and thus the taxpayers, who have no culpability in these crimes are punished.

Moskos asks "Given the choice between five years and ten lashes, wouldn’t you choose the lash?" to which I'd say definitely yes. Give the problems of rampant overcrowding, prison violence and pervasive rape I'd say prison is a horrible place to go and I'd gladly endure the pain of flogging to avoid prison.

I wouldn't go out and say that flogging is necessarily the best form of non-prison punishment. Fines, for one, make sense in many cases, such as drug possession and financial and property crimes; damage to reputation is an under appreciated punishment (think for example of stockades, or a highly visible letter sewed on someone's clothing, a la The Scarlet Letter, or a swastika carved in someone's forehead a la Inglorious Basterds); people can be monitored and tracked for much cheaper than imprisonment; and perhaps other forms of physical punishment might be better. The best solutions for each case would require some careful thought (hmm, what about branding people on their arm for certain crimes?). But what is obvious is that prison is simply not a good idea for many of the crimes for which it is applied.

Immediate Benefits/Deferred Costs

I had noted earlier that "trial and error is the most consistently powerful method for attaining knowledge," and had suggested, that just as experimental trials have been powerful in advancing scientific, they'd also be powerful in improving public policy.

But I had a few caveats, mostly on the limits of when trial and error can be applied, but most important was the last: "it's a bit unrealistic to expect that governments, after a long history of ignoring scientific evidence and expert opinion, to suddenly start building policy on evidence." This is a statement that begs expansion, and we might mention many such as "diffuse costs/concentrated benefits," "rent seeking" and "regulatory capture."

Bryan Caplan also adds "Short Time Horizon," pointing to a nice explanation by Tim Hartford in his new book Adapt. Politicians have short terms and thus need to create visible benefits within short time periods. This leads to a condition we might call "Immediate Benefits/Deferred costs." And it makes running trials because trials take so long and frequently lead to unpopular conclusions.

Sunday, May 29, 2011

Specialization in Philosophy

Justin E. H. Smith opines in the New York Times last week about the loss of curiosity in Philosophy. There are some fair points in the article, though I must disagree with his emphasis on curiosity or the lack thereof as the problem.

For one, philosophy over history has radically changed since the early days. Back in the times of Ancient Greece when the term "Philosophy" was coined, it simply meant pursuit of knowledge, in the broadest sense of the term, including math, science, ethics, ontology, logic, epistemology and so on. Over time, the pursuit of knowledge has become more specialized. This process hasn't been guided by a loss of curiosity, as Smith seems to suggest, but really is a difference in the effectiveness of truth-seeking techniques in various sub-disciplines of the pursuit of knowledge. Rapid advancement in the rigors of mathematical logic and theorems meant this field became an area of specialization on its own very early on. Later, during the scientific revolution, important thinkers such as Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, Galileo Galilei and Isaac Newton introduced to philosophy new techniques of observation, experimentation and mathematical rigor which permitted ideas to be more decisively tested and led to real progress in these fields. But such techniques didn't apply to all fields of knowledge-pursuit, only to certain fields. It really only applied to physics, originally, but it expanded to other disciplines. Important discoveries led to development of chemistry and biology as independent disciplines in their own right. Other disciplines now considered part of science, such as medicine, psychology and economics didn't immediately benefit from these new techniques; they advanced slowly for a while, even after the scientific revolution, but eventually they developed and emerged as their own sub-disciplines with their own specialists. As these various disciplines of math, physics, chemistry, psychology, economics, biology began to make rapid advances in their theoretical underpinnings and established understanding, they became inaccessible to the broadly curious dilettante. To be a competent physicist, for example, as has been the case for a long time, requires considerable education and training before one can expect to make substantive contributions to the discipline, and such has been the case of all of these various disciplines that have pealed off and established themselves independently of the broader pursuit of knowledge.

Some disciplines haven't benefited from these advances, especially fields like ontology, ethics, metaphysics, axiology, aesthetics and political science, fields which are now considered to be part of "philosophy." But all this "philosophy" is, really, just the leftover husk after various other disciplines have been pealed away. No real advancement has been made in these fields since the beginning. We haven't made any new advances in, say, ethics, in the past 2000 years. The reason is, I believe, because there simply are no good ways of disproving relevant philosophical theories. Assuredly, one can make a defense in support of an idea; for example, if I wanted to argue that there is a substantial dualism between mind and body, I could concoct an argument like Descartes did. All a person could do in response is refute the argument, or perhaps offer a different argument. But refuting an argument doesn't refute the conclusion (truths can be defended with fallacious arguments; pointing to the fallacies in the arguments, doesn't disprove the truth, only the argument), and any counter-argument will itself be inevitably open to refutation. Judging between the merits of various arguments and counter-arguments is highly subjective, and so we're left without any definite determination of which idea is superior. In certain scientific fields, though, we've found very strong ways of refuting theories, running experiments. For example, if you want to test out the caloric theory of heat, you run an experiment. A well-designed experiment can all but completely disprove a theory: all you have to, for example, is prove that frictional heat provides an endless supply of heat (whereas caloric theory proposes that each thing contains a finite amount of caloric heat). Positively proving theories is difficult in science and fraught with uncertainty, but the ability to get rid of bad theories strengthens the certainty behind those that remain. If we could narrow down the field of possible candidates for a theory of mind, for example, then we could focus our energy on those that remain, weeding out more bad ones and better refining the good ones. That would be progress. But we can't do that in philosohpy.

Now all of this advancement in other fields, as I said, has led to specialization, which is quite a good thing, since it allows the overall collaborative project of science to advance much more rapidly in many more directions. But it also has drawbacks, if the various disciplines and sub-discliplines and sub-sub-discliplines become too specialized, then no one will have sufficient general knowledge to integrate them and the people who become too focused on narrow disciplines might make poor theories that would be improved by taking into account the big picture. These are trade offs that science takes for the sake of greater and more rapid advancement. They're partially addressed by popularizers and generalists who try to summarize all of this knowledge and bring it to people outside of the field, but it still is a limitation. The problem with philosophy is that such trade offs don't make sense. Since philosophy hasn't progressed, for example, in the area of the philosophy of mind since the days of Descartes, all that specialization in philosophy leads to is more theories in philosophy of mind. In short, whereas in scientific fields, the great expansion in knowledge has led to expansion in specialists (since no one person can take in all this knowledge) in philosophy specialization has only been driven by the need for a person to have a grasp on all the competing and, quite frequently, equally plausible theories. Specialization makes sense if progress is being made, but not if we're just spinning out more theories.

In Smith's article, he focuses really on the problem of curiosity as plaguing philosophy. Though I would diagnose the problem somewhat differently, him and I both agree on what's fundamentally wrong with philosophy: it's too specialized, too narrowly focused. He believes that philosophers should be unafraid to research irrelevant trivia, just for the sake of curiosity. I believe that philosophers should be generalists, not just within the fields that are still left for philosophy, but within all fields. Of course, such broad knowledge means that a philosopher will never have deep knowledge within any one area, but that's what we have the scientists for. And within the area of philosophy since no advancement in knowledge nor any sort of certain conclusions are forthcoming, the exploration of broad theories of everything is just as worthwhile as the mincing apart ever more detailed theories of mind.

When philosophers specialize too much, they risk making themselves obsolete. Philosopher has too much become a discipline of very well-eduated professionals simply talking to each other, without their theories translating into broader application for the public as a whole. Within science the hope is that the specialization will lead to applications that will benefit people, even if such applications aren't immediately obvious. But such is not the case with philosophy. Only when one tries to come up with theories that really, in the broadest sense are meaningful to people and help them make sense of the complex world we live in, will philosophy be relevant. Philosophers are sort of artists of the mind, and the more tools from the great toolbox of human knowledge they can employ, the better the works of art they create.

Saturday, May 28, 2011

The Eldritch Quagmire of Lovecraft's Copyrights

I had recently been reading through the works that are generally considered part of H. P. Lovecraft's dreamland stories, including "The Case of Charles Dexter Ward," "Nyarlathotep," and "The Dream Quest of Unknown Kadath." When looking for online copies of these works, I stumbled upon the rather tangled copyright questions concerning Lovecraft's works: are any of his stories under copyright, and if so which ones, and if so who owns the copyright. I should say at the outset that I reached no resolution on determining whether Lovecraft's works are in the public domain and believe no resolution is forthcoming.

All of Lovecraft's works entered the public domain in the EU in 2008, since the EU decided that copyright in all cases is merely 70 years after the death of the author and Lovecraft died in 1937. Australia's Gutenberg project has virtually all of his fictional works up, since the works are apparently in the public domain in Australia. But in the US it's more uncertain. Wikisource has an even more complete collection though it notes that some works are under copyright, and there is an extensive wikipedia entry on this question. At the US gutenberg site, the only works available are some early works, and in fact they've deliberately declined to offer any of the later works. Librivox.org similarly, only records works from 1922 and earlier (with the sole exception, so far, of The Shunned House, which first appeared in an amateur press and didn't originally have its copyright registered). You would think copyright would be a moot point since Lovecraft died 74 years ago, but you would be assuming that copyright law actually makes sense. As one Gutenberg staffer says Lovecraft is a rather interesting case.

To start off, any book published prior to 1923 is in the public domain. Some of Lovecraft's early works fall in this time period. But all of his most famous works, including "Call of Cthulhu," "Dreams in the Witch House," "At the Mountains of Madness" and so on were written after 1923. Before 1976, all works had to be registered with the copyright office to avoid falling into the public domain, and many of Lovecraft's works (the ones published in amateur presses) were almost certainly never registered. Additionally, any work published between the years 1923-1963, not only had to have been originally registered, but had to have that copyright renewed sometime between 1950 and 1992 to avoid avoid falling into the public domain. If it was renewed, then it is copyrighted until 95 years after publication. Unfortunately, there's no official database that explicitly lists which works published before 1963 had their copyright renewed. The Copyright Office has an online database of works renewed after 1977, but if the work was renewed from 1950-1977, that requires searching through the copyright office's database of physical paper records. The Stanford library has tried to address this, with their Copyright Renewal Database, which has tried to put all of the renewals into a digital, searchable form. If we just wanted to answer the question, for example, whether the "Call of Cthulhu" is in the public domain we can do searches for "Lovecraft," "Cthulhu" or "Weird Tales" (the publication that it was first published in). The only renewals we find are those of August Derleth and Donald Wandrei, Lovecraft proteges who edited and published several early collections of Lovecraft's works. They registered and renewed the copyrights on some collections they published of Lovecraft's works. But copyrights on such collections normally only cover new material and contributions, namely the arrangement, editing, introductions and any new stories; they wouldn't apply directly to Lovecraft's original work. Thus, if one went back and republished the original Cthulhu story published in Weird Tales in 1928, those copyrights presumably wouldn't apply. And no further evidence of other renewals has been found.

There may be, nonetheless, some exceptions, namely in works originally published posthumously by Darleth and Wandrei. For example, Derleth and Wandrei registered and renewed the copyright to Beyond the Walls of Sleep, in which the "Dream Quest of Unknown Kadath," first appeared and in which "The Case of Charles Dexter Ward," was first published in its complete form. If they held full rights to these works at the time of publication, they may have successfully renewed rights to these works. But with the rest of the stories, there appears to be no evidence of renewal.

Unfortunately, there have been and still are copyright holders that claim the rights. Chris J Karr has a long article detailing the claims of these copyright holders. As he first explains, there are 23 works of Lovecraft that were written prior to 1923 and 15 works that never had their copyright registered, but the remaining 27 works are uncertain. They are claimed to be held by Arkham House Publishers, a publishing house founded by Derleth and Wandrei, and by Lovecraft's reconstituted literary estate.

It is generally believed that Lovecraft retained all rights to his works published from 1926 forward (though we don't have documentation to confirm this). In the period 1923-25, he published a few works in amateur presses like The Tryout that didn't register their copyrights, and six works in Weird Tales, which did register its copyrights. Weird Tales did transfer whatever rights it held to Derleth and Wandrei and Arkham House in 1947, which would probably only include the short stories "The Festival," "The Hound," "The Temple," "The Unnameable," "The Horror at Martin's Beach," and "Under the Pyramids." As already stated, there is no evidence that the copyrights were renewed on these stories.

Of the rights to the remaining 21 works published from 1926-37, that Lovecraft retained rights to, his rights were transferred, upon his death in 1937, to his only heir, his aunt, Annie Gamwell. Gamwell transferred the royalties in her will to Derleth and Wandrei, but the copyrights she held and these were transferred to her heirs, Edna Lewis and Ethel Morrish. Lewis and Morrish subsequently transferred at least some of their rights to Arkham House in an agreement. The problem is that the language of the agreement in which Morrish and Lewis ostensibly gave rights to Derleth and Wandrei is not clear about what rights are being transferred, and many dispute whether copyrights were actually transferred by this agreement. The question is whether granting "the right to publish H. P. Lovecraft's work," and "sell second serial rights" constitutes giving them full copyrights or just amounts to giving them permission to publish and collect the royalties.

All of this would be moot if the copyrights weren't renewed. Even if there is no evidence of renewal, it's possible that when Darleth and Wandrei renewed the copyrights to collections in which Lovecraft's works were republished, this constituted renewal of the copyright on those works; it's also possible renewals were made that have simply not been found. Karr concludes that all of Lovecraft's work are in the public domain, based on arguments used by Arkham House in a much later lawsuit with Wandrei. The lawsuit was over disputed royalties apparently owed to Wandrei. Arkham house used the argument that Wandrei was not owed royalties because he lacked the rights to the relevant works because the copyrights were never renewed. Karr takes this as definitive, since it is the statement of the publishing house itself that the publishing house did not own the rights to any of the works of Lovecraft that might be under copyright. I'm not so confident that Karr is right, since it's entirely possible that Arkham House is mistaken and such a statement in the context of a lawsuit needn't be legally binding, and Karr notes that Arkham house and the reconstituted Lovecraft estate still claim to the own the copyrights (for example, copyright notices of Lovecraft Properties LLC, the reconstituted Lovecraft estate, here and here). But, without any records of renewal, it's about the strongest evidence available.

For my money, I'd say all of Lovecraft's are probably in the public domain (possibly excepting writings published posthumously, such as "Dream Quest of Unknown Kadath" and "The Case of Charles Dexter Ward), but there really is no answer to the question of their copyright status. Were the rights properly renewed? Were they transferred to Arkham House? Copyright law has been stretched so far into the past that lost documentation, orphaned works and uncertainties about ownership become more and more problematic. All we can say is that if someone were to challenge copyright ownership, a court would be able to come to a decision, but the decision could go either way. It's doubtful it'll be worth anyone's time and money to try and resolve this in court, and this makes the situation de facto as if the copyrights still hold, since no one wants to risk getting sued (thought the copyright holders haven't, at least so far been zealous in pursuing their lawsuits). So, long as no one challenges their claim, the persons claiming own the rights, own them by default. And the issue won't really be resolved until 2032 when the last of Lovecraft's works published in his lifetime will enter the public domain (and I'm excluding the few posthumous publications, which appeared as late as 1944), unless there's another copyright extension, which would just push all of this mess forward.

All of this really illustrates the absurdity of copyright law, which only grows more absurd the further copyrights are extended. Today, copyright law covers works published before 1978 for 95 years after their publication and 70 years after the death of the author for works published since 1978. Such a term undermines the original intention of copyright law, namely to encourage the creation of art. Not only do rights devolve to people who have no part in the creation of original works, but the longer the term, the more copyright holders invest in protecting valuable copyrights and the less they invest in creating new copyrightable works. But, just as I said before, assuming that copyright law should actually abide by its purported rationale assumes that copyright law actually makes sense.

Friday, May 27, 2011

Too Many Ideas, Not Enough Time

In one of Nietzsche's notebooks from early 1886 there's a passage in which he wrote "The Titles of Ten New Books." And then he lists out the names of all these books that he's thinking about writing: "The Will to Power," "The Artist," "We Godless Ones," "Midday and Eternity," "Beyond Good and Evil," "Gai Saber," "Music," "Experiences of a Scribe" and "The History of Modern Darkening." Of these ten books, the only one that Nietzsche would end up writing is "Beyond Good and Evil," which he would complete later in 1886. "The Will to Power" he spent considerable time working on, but ultimately he never finished it before the onset of his insanity in January of 1889. The problem for Nietzsche wasn't a lack of ideas or things to write about, it was a lack of time to bring these ideas to fruition. He wanted to write them all, I'm sure, but it took time to write some of them and other projects intervened. He certainly kept himself very busy for the next three years, producing several books, but he just couldn't write everything he wanted to.

I had mentioned earlier that ideas are cheap. Though I hope I have a lot more time ahead of me than Nietzsche, I've still got more ideas for stories and novels than I can write right now, and will probably come up with new ideas before I put all of my current ideas into execution. I'm sure Nietzsche would've gladly traded his overabundance of ideas for some more time. It's basic supply and demand: too many ideas means low value. The only people who are complaining about people stealing their ideas are people that don't have many.

Thursday, May 26, 2011

Thiel Fellowship

Peter Thiel, a co-founder of PayPal, has picked 24 finalists to eschew college for two years. The 24 finalists will receive $100,000 and spend the time trying to develop business ideas. The idea basically is that college is simply not worth it for some students (it's expensive and time-consuming, might be a bubble), and they'd be better off finding success through a different route. Thiel's fellowship is not popular with everyone, but it raises questions at a time when many are seeing an expansion of the number of students going to college as a worthwhile goal, and the stats are showing that more and more college grads are going into careers that don't require college degrees.

Insider Trading 2

I noted earlier the advantage of superior information as a reason to legalize insider trading, but we also might note the unfairness of enforcement as another reason to get rid of insider trading. The Washington Times notes:
An extensive study released Wednesday in the journal Business and Politics found that the investments of members of the House of Representatives outperformed those of the average investor by 55 basis points per month, or 6 percent annually, suggesting that lawmakers are taking advantage of inside information to fatten their stock portfolios.
Mark Perry concurs); we should eliminate insider trading laws. Addressing an unfair situation (where some have unfair access to information) with an unfair law isn't an improvement. I think it's fair to say: you can't legislate fairness.